Did the Russian State... Part XIV by Nils Johann (Conclusion)

It are not always the material ripples of historical events that reach us. The stories of events that in their time were relevant, may much sooner reach us. The way these then are imbued with new meaning, sometimes is the only thing that makes a historical event seem relevant. It is in some way misleading, to maintain that past occasions, at any price, effect future development, that is far-flung in time, and separated by centuries. The second chapter of the paper demonstrated this, all though from an 'eagle's perspective'. This enabled us to see how the myth of a liberal, democratic and prosperous 'Western Europe', by force or ignorance, has been projected back in time, to comply with our contemporary notions and fancies of what is right and proper, while disregarding the immense change, forced upon the societies, and Institutions, that experienced the brunt, and sudden force of the Industrial Revolution.

On that basis it seems plausible, that the backwards-projection of Cold War reality, like in the leading case of Wittfogel's Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study in Total Power, certain misleads, and errors, have been allowed to occur in our perception of 16th century Russia. A tense Anglo-Russian relationship during the middle of the 19th century may have worked to establish the same effect, during the infancy of modern historiography. The emphasis on what separates the Russian and 'West-European' state formation process of the 16th century, is therefore in this paper interpreted as a false dichotomy. The dilettante 'National Histories' of the age, that favored long chains of causality for explaining their contemporary surroundings in the frame of 'The Nation', assumed, just like Yanov, Landes, Ferguson, and others, that there must be a chain-reaction spanning centuries in order to explain their contemporary condition. In order to make the writing more relevant lines of connections seem to be forced into the narrative, either backwards or forwards. Cum hoc ergo propter hoc, is a common error of reasoning where 'Correlation' is mistaken for 'Causation'. We need not all act as Skinner's pigeons.

This paper notes the challenge posed by the anachronistic concepts superimposed on the interpretation of the age, to understanding the age of Ivan and Henry on its own premise. As a response it attempts a comparison of the reigns of Ivan IV and Henry VIII. The comparison is intended to serve as an internal frame for reference for the period, but is also a search for positive similarities between the regimes. What is shown by this is a general similarity. It is tricky in such a comparison to discriminate perfectly without going in the trap of just 'cherry-picking' the examples one wants, but the paper focuses on the general conditions of statecraft of the age. By giving a general introduction to wider European developments, shaped by stronger Monarchs, who manage a paper-bureaucracy, and standing gunpowder armies, the paper sets the stage of its main subject, while establishing possibility for wider contextualisation. It then progresses to an introduction of the formation of the 'royal houses' of Henry VIII and Ivan IV, with a brief resume of their families 'road', to the power that the Monarchs would wield. Both monarchs temper and subdue the noblemen that surround them in order to ferment their own power-base. Their methods were brutal and efficient. Whether the opponents of the Crown were executed by boiling alive, drawn and quartered, or any other number of imaginative methods, the principle seems to be the same with both Crowns: Maintaining order by demonstrating power, through the application of violence.

Simply: Installing Terror. The Technical breakthroughs of the time enabled the ruling of larger territories, accompanied by centralization of power, not seen in Europe since the decline of the Roman Empire. This then also called for a restructuring of governance. Parliamentary systems are reformed to adapt to this reality and, are re-functioned to act as management organs of the Crown. At the time none of these Parliaments are embryonic 'democratic' institutions, in the modern sense of the word, but they function as a line of communication between the Monarch and the Commoners. Their main function is however to recognize the laws of the Monarch, and to effectuate the levying of taxes. The taxes are in both cases intended to serve the foreign policy of the King. - The protection of the realm; the execution of war-craft. Differences occur in the detail of how Ivan and Henry chose, or can choose, to fill their 'war-chest', and there is better method to the plan of Henry. He implicates part of his loyal nobility in his robbery of the Church, while Ivan's Oprichina leads to the estrangement, and tempering, of his high nobility. The funds from their respective heist, do however go towards the same purpose. They carry the war to their enemies, subduing them, plundering, and gaining dominance of even larger tracts of land. By the crack of the lash, and the screaming of cannon, with bloody sword in one hand, and a pen in the other, surrounded by rich palaces and poor peasants, gibbets, and henchmen, proto-bureaucratic states were formed, both in England and in Russia. They were materializing in all of Europe in the period.

Comparing two reigns of respectively forty-three and sixty years, of almost continual warfare at the western rim of Eurasia, called for an eagle-perspective in this paper, that ignores detailed differences in the formation of Russia and England, which there of course are. The grand lines of the narrative of the paper, however demonstrates that there are remarkable similarities in the formation of Russia and England. Russia is in its proto-state's functioning, during the period of the 16th century, more alike, than unlike England.

So, if you have taken the time to read through this whole paper, what are your thoughts? Any disagreements? What did you like and feel like you learned?

Did the Russian State... Part XIII by Nils Johann (A Bloody Trail of Death and Destruction?)

"I am a Christian and do not eat meat during Lent", said Ivan to him. "But you drink human blood," the saint replied.”

Body-count competitions are rather tedious. To manipulate statistics is not hard, and to make them with fragmentary sources, that have been 'scrubbed by the sands of time' is profoundly suspicious. It is however done, and the results are used as “facts”, to hammer in one or another point. Both Ivan and Henry killed challengers to their regime. Real, or maybe imagined challengers, but that is beyond the point. Doing so keeps others 'in line'. Crummey makes a number out of foreigners being shaken by the sight of the executions. No doubt they would have been as shaken by witnessing the 'drawing and quartering' of an English Abbot, as by the impaling of a Russian Prince. Being foreign would have had less to do with it. Impaling might sound gruesome, but is it worse than starving to death in an English gibbet?

The Bishop of Lisieux (Lexovia), claimed that Henry had over 72,000 great thieves, petty thieves and beggars executed during his reign.“For there is not one year wherein three hundred or four hundred of them are not devoured and eaten by the gallows in one place or another”. It is not impossible considering the duration of his reign. It would mean about 2000 in an average year, with a stable population of about 2.8 million. It was custom to garotte or hang even petty thieves, and the 'mop-up' after the dissolution of the monasteries and the rebellions, with the loss of poor-relief from the monasteries, could have added the rest. It is however hard to consider the fragmentary hearsay, as a reliable source. It is a domestic estimate, and for diversion we could surely by far double the number by adding the ones that died in the many wars, acts of immense cruelty, with its content of rapine, murder and pillage.

Another example in this manner, from Russia, is the punishment of Novgorod, exacted by the Oprichniki of Ivan. Skrynnikov had the surviving prayer-lists of Kirillo-Belozersky Monastery, that listed 1505 names of wealthy citizens killed. He assessed 2-3 thousand killed in total. This number could surely as well be inflated by Ivan's many campaigns.

But this chapter shall not become a competition of cruelty. By my standards, they were both cruel. But it is at least in part, a measured cruelty with an aim, like Machiavelli prescribes -if we look away from the occasional killings of family-members. Maybe, especially Ivan, who struck his son and heir dead in a loss of temper. But also Henry, who used his state to kill several of his wives, after the formalities of a 'kangaroo-court', with himself as judge. Like Crummey writes about 'Mad Czar Ivan' basing his claim on the cruel manner of the Czar's politics, there are publications to the same effect, but not as full with regards to Henry's style of government. When it comes to the understanding of the cruelty of Monarchs, this perspective disregards something in the understanding of social and political power. It may have gotten lost by the peaceful, sanitized, life that most 'Westerners' enjoy. George Mac Donald Fraser's figure, H. Flashman, gives an interesting interpretative perspective:

“...I've heard some say that she [Ranavalona I of Madagascar (R:1828–1861)] was just plain mad and didn't know what she was doing. That's an old excuse which ordinary folk take refuge in because they don't care to believe there are people who enjoy inflicting pain. "He's mad," they'll say - but they only say it because they see a little of themselves in the Tyrant, too, and want to shudder away from it quickly, like well-bred little Christians. Mad? Aye, Ranavalona was mad as a hatter, in many ways - but not where cruelty was concerned. She knew quite what she was doing, and studied to do it better, and was deeply gratified by it,...”

When 'push comes to shove', 'Power' is held by the application of 'Violence'. Being able to harm other people demonstrates social dominance. Being able to harm great numbers of people, demonstrates, and communicates, great dominance. It is (too) easy to declare cruel people to be mad. Another perspective on madness, would be that you are only mad, if you damage your own position. -Harm yourself. Public torture is a matter of communicating with society at large. Our Monarchs had no other option for maintaining their order. There were no logistics or alternative methods for it, as the surplus to afford them only become unleashed with the steam-engine. What Crummey describes, as Ivan's paranoia, leading him into destructive experiments, and a reign of terror, seems to be a 'public management trend' among all rulers of the time, suffering kindred material realities.

Being perceived as mad by your opposition is also not, a all in all, bad thing. It usually just means they can not predict your actions or 'read your mind'. A modern example of this could be the 'brinkmanship' of the Kennedy administration during the 'Cuban Missile Crisis'. And 'Terror' can still, even in the modern 'West' be a ruling instrument, as it is elegantly demonstrated in Adam Curtis' work, The Power of Nightmares, even though it, as a tool, has been refined somewhat over the years.

Our two rulers might have been slick, brutal bullies. Merciless, but must they not also have been charismatic and cocksure? Most likely good orators. With a life full of surprises, and uncertainty, doubt, and fear? They grew into their position of power. They surely were remarkable, to be able to sustain themselves, develop their realms in what was, by no doubt hostile political environments. We can of course meet the stories as those mentioned above with moral outrage, over the 'bestiality' of such persons, and try to spin a moral tale out of their deeds. But if this was their way, the simple question that should be posed is; When those who succeeded, all waged war in this manner, and ruled by murdering their opposition and killing who resisted them, can we then judge such men as Ivan and Henry for surviving?

Comments? Thoughts?

Did the Russian State... Part X by Nils Johann ('Some of us have talked...')

'Parliament' is the normal consequence of people trying to live together, and the English alone, developed neither of those two concepts. Neither did Ivan IV invent it in Russia. Communities meet to talk, and decide on matters regarding the community. The 'Veche' in early mediaeval Russia, preceded the Russian state-formation, and it worked as a Forum, for talks on economics, law and war, like the Norse Thing or the Swiss Landesgemeinde. The free cities of Pskov and Novgorod are often held up as later examples of these kinds of assemblies. None of the assemblies, like the Veche, or Parliament were open to everyone. We need to keep that in mind, before we start to romanticize a pragmatic tool of government. They are fori, where those who have franchise in the state, -those who contribute directly to the state, meet. “Taxpayers” in one form, or another; warriors, landowners, merchants and master tradesmen. Those who possess a vital skill or a business. After the gathering of the dispersed territories under Muscovite rule, these forms already in existence, were utilized by Ivan IV. He used it to govern and organize his realm, and he enacted reforms of many sectors of state. Opinion on how Ivan's Zemsky Sobor worked differ, from that it was a puppet parliament, there to enact his will, to a (sometimes) legitimate channel of popular representation. Crummey states,“...it would be a mistake to view it as an embryonic representative institution.”

To counter the claim in Crummey: It would be a mistake to see the English parliament aslittle more than a constant Byzantine court intrigue.

If we look at how Henry used his parliament to shore up the power of the Crown, there is however no great difference to Ivan's use. And here a special understanding is needed, because this will seem odd to those of us, accustomed with a modern parliamentary system. It needs to be seen in regard to the justification for power, being derived from 'Divine Right', and thus parliament gathers with the Monarch, for him to explain how he understands the will of God, and for them to agree that his interpretation is correct. And who wants to anger the Warlord who runs the “legal” punishment-system? But with this in mind, inevitably the system must have communicated in both directions. (*To relate Crummey's statement to a anachronistic example of representative government, the United States of America might serve. Even though regulation varied across the states, on average 5% of the adult population maintained the right to suffrage. The right to representation was restricted even more, but the representatives were deeming themselves as representatives of the entire populous. )

In order to effectuate policy, and to communicate better with the vast domain of the Czar, he called for 'The Assembly of the Land' in 1549. It was made up by the tree usual estates, The Nobles, The Church, and The (rich) Townspeople and Merchants. This 'Zemsky Sobor' developed to gathering regularly after that, and was also taken to advice on controversial issues. It seems, its main purpose was to agree with (or “understand”) the Czar's interpretation of the will of God, as was the case in England. In addition, a council of chosen nobles, The 'Rada' or a 'governing council' if you will, was established, and the organization of The Church was centralized. The 'Stoglavy Sobor' ('Gathering of Hundred Heads') was used to unify the practices of the Church's rituals and its regulations. Like with the Zemsky Sobor, it was done to streamline the 'chain of command', and to ease management. In rural regions, increased local self-government was introduced. The communal councils were attributed privileges that prior to that had been the jurisdiction of the local noblemen / governors.

One trait was the 'popular' election of local tax-men. Crummey claims;

“The explanation for the Monarch's broad power lies not so much in the efficiency of his government as in the lack of barriers to his exercise of it; for no estates or corporate organizations limited the Grand Princes' freedom of action, and no constitutional norms defined their authority.”

Crummey's work ignores the bargain character of what Ivan builds, as these systems inevitably will communicate both ways. Further on, the work also ignores that there is Law, and that the system of Ivan seems to be a “normal” Divine-Right-Monarchy for its time. Even more remarkable, is Shepard's comment in his review of Crummey, when he concludes on the basis of Crummey's work;

“But at the end of Ivan's reign, after all the blood-letting, he still ruled with the collaboration of the clans of the higher nobility, and for the most part these were the same clans that had been pre-eminent in the opening years of his adult reign!”

It is a interesting contradiction to take note of. If there is cooperation with the high-nobility within the Rada, how can it be that there are “no estates or corporate organization” to limit the Grand Prince? The 'Zemsky Sobor' was also a tool for achieving cooperation, and this does not differ greatly from the English 'Parliament' during the period.

Henry needed capital to wage war for his dynastic claims on the continent, and to construct palaces. He had emptied his coffers and exhausted the land by the middle of the 1520's. The system of taxation had to be reformed in order to enrich the Crown. The first plan was executed by the King's Minister, Cardinal Thomas Wolsey (*1473–†1530), who managed to gather funds through an increase of the tax-burden on the wealthy, land-'theft', and by forcing the nobility to “buy” a kind of prototype state-obligation.

As we remember from Spittler's definition above, we are here looking at two semi-bureaucratic states where income comes from personal agricultural landholdings, and to a minor extent from the tariffs on foreign trade. Both monarchs, next to the tariffs on foreign trade, gain their means from their personal land-holdings. For any further taxation, the security of the realm needed to be at risk. This would also have been the main reason to call together 'Parliament'. The dominant reason for any self-respecting monarch to talk to a 'Common House', would have been to enact special taxes, without too much resistance. (This might be a motivational factor for the constant warfare of the period. Special taxes would have to be justified, as issues of defense of the realm. It served the concentration of capital, and the centralization of co-ordination, to the Crown.) However, if he could, the Monarch would avoid the hassle of having other people telling him how to run his 'firm'.

This takes us then to the great heist, performed in a similar way, in order to achieve similar ends, by both monarchs. The details of course differ, but Henry and Ivan do come to a remarkable solution to their challenges, regarding organizational and financial autocracy. Their goal is it to reduce dependence of people that are not necessarily to be trusted, discipline their own rank, and to gain a higher degree of fiscal independence. The Monarchs' role as Primus Interpares was changing in many emerging states during this time. As the positions become more polarized, we see the emergence of Autocracies (Denmark, Russia, Iberia, France, and England until the civil war), and their counterpart, noble-republics (The Netherlands, The Swiss federation, and to some extent also Sweden and Poland,).