Did the Russian State... Part XIII by Nils Johann (A Bloody Trail of Death and Destruction?)

"I am a Christian and do not eat meat during Lent", said Ivan to him. "But you drink human blood," the saint replied.”

Body-count competitions are rather tedious. To manipulate statistics is not hard, and to make them with fragmentary sources, that have been 'scrubbed by the sands of time' is profoundly suspicious. It is however done, and the results are used as “facts”, to hammer in one or another point. Both Ivan and Henry killed challengers to their regime. Real, or maybe imagined challengers, but that is beyond the point. Doing so keeps others 'in line'. Crummey makes a number out of foreigners being shaken by the sight of the executions. No doubt they would have been as shaken by witnessing the 'drawing and quartering' of an English Abbot, as by the impaling of a Russian Prince. Being foreign would have had less to do with it. Impaling might sound gruesome, but is it worse than starving to death in an English gibbet?

The Bishop of Lisieux (Lexovia), claimed that Henry had over 72,000 great thieves, petty thieves and beggars executed during his reign.“For there is not one year wherein three hundred or four hundred of them are not devoured and eaten by the gallows in one place or another”. It is not impossible considering the duration of his reign. It would mean about 2000 in an average year, with a stable population of about 2.8 million. It was custom to garotte or hang even petty thieves, and the 'mop-up' after the dissolution of the monasteries and the rebellions, with the loss of poor-relief from the monasteries, could have added the rest. It is however hard to consider the fragmentary hearsay, as a reliable source. It is a domestic estimate, and for diversion we could surely by far double the number by adding the ones that died in the many wars, acts of immense cruelty, with its content of rapine, murder and pillage.

Another example in this manner, from Russia, is the punishment of Novgorod, exacted by the Oprichniki of Ivan. Skrynnikov had the surviving prayer-lists of Kirillo-Belozersky Monastery, that listed 1505 names of wealthy citizens killed. He assessed 2-3 thousand killed in total. This number could surely as well be inflated by Ivan's many campaigns.

But this chapter shall not become a competition of cruelty. By my standards, they were both cruel. But it is at least in part, a measured cruelty with an aim, like Machiavelli prescribes -if we look away from the occasional killings of family-members. Maybe, especially Ivan, who struck his son and heir dead in a loss of temper. But also Henry, who used his state to kill several of his wives, after the formalities of a 'kangaroo-court', with himself as judge. Like Crummey writes about 'Mad Czar Ivan' basing his claim on the cruel manner of the Czar's politics, there are publications to the same effect, but not as full with regards to Henry's style of government. When it comes to the understanding of the cruelty of Monarchs, this perspective disregards something in the understanding of social and political power. It may have gotten lost by the peaceful, sanitized, life that most 'Westerners' enjoy. George Mac Donald Fraser's figure, H. Flashman, gives an interesting interpretative perspective:

“...I've heard some say that she [Ranavalona I of Madagascar (R:1828–1861)] was just plain mad and didn't know what she was doing. That's an old excuse which ordinary folk take refuge in because they don't care to believe there are people who enjoy inflicting pain. "He's mad," they'll say - but they only say it because they see a little of themselves in the Tyrant, too, and want to shudder away from it quickly, like well-bred little Christians. Mad? Aye, Ranavalona was mad as a hatter, in many ways - but not where cruelty was concerned. She knew quite what she was doing, and studied to do it better, and was deeply gratified by it,...”

When 'push comes to shove', 'Power' is held by the application of 'Violence'. Being able to harm other people demonstrates social dominance. Being able to harm great numbers of people, demonstrates, and communicates, great dominance. It is (too) easy to declare cruel people to be mad. Another perspective on madness, would be that you are only mad, if you damage your own position. -Harm yourself. Public torture is a matter of communicating with society at large. Our Monarchs had no other option for maintaining their order. There were no logistics or alternative methods for it, as the surplus to afford them only become unleashed with the steam-engine. What Crummey describes, as Ivan's paranoia, leading him into destructive experiments, and a reign of terror, seems to be a 'public management trend' among all rulers of the time, suffering kindred material realities.

Being perceived as mad by your opposition is also not, a all in all, bad thing. It usually just means they can not predict your actions or 'read your mind'. A modern example of this could be the 'brinkmanship' of the Kennedy administration during the 'Cuban Missile Crisis'. And 'Terror' can still, even in the modern 'West' be a ruling instrument, as it is elegantly demonstrated in Adam Curtis' work, The Power of Nightmares, even though it, as a tool, has been refined somewhat over the years.

Our two rulers might have been slick, brutal bullies. Merciless, but must they not also have been charismatic and cocksure? Most likely good orators. With a life full of surprises, and uncertainty, doubt, and fear? They grew into their position of power. They surely were remarkable, to be able to sustain themselves, develop their realms in what was, by no doubt hostile political environments. We can of course meet the stories as those mentioned above with moral outrage, over the 'bestiality' of such persons, and try to spin a moral tale out of their deeds. But if this was their way, the simple question that should be posed is; When those who succeeded, all waged war in this manner, and ruled by murdering their opposition and killing who resisted them, can we then judge such men as Ivan and Henry for surviving?

Comments? Thoughts?

Did the Russian State... Part XI by Nils Johann (Their Great Heists)

Henry's father had already appropriated the holdings of prominent opponents in the past, stealing land under the guise of legality. Already during the prominence (1509-1529) of Cardinal Wolsey (who at the same time was the Papal Legate to England), the dissolution of thirty monasteries had taken place (1525-6), under the charge of 'corruption', their estates fell to benefit The Crown. This can however only be seen as inspirational pilfering, compared to what was to follow. Facing tax-rebellion and strikes by 1525, and having exhausted the state's economy for prospects of re-conquering English claims in France. Henry had no other choice than to seek peace, putting at rest military ambitions for the following decade, until he, and 'Lord keeper of the Privy Seal' Thomas Cromwell, (*1485–†1540) 'lash out' against The Church. The Acts of 'Suppression of Religious Houses' were forced through Parliament from 1536 up until 1539. In 1534 Cromwell had established an office that made a tour of appraisal, to estimate the worth of the monastic holdings. The holdings were made up of about a quarter of the real-estate in the realm. They started by appropriating the smaller estates. This spurred quite a large resistance. Resistors were to be gibbeted, hung, or drawn and quartered. This amounted to a larger rebellion. After it had been 'struck down', all ringleaders were executed, even though pardons had been offered and their demands had been accepted. To establish credibility the Abbots of Colchester, Glastonbury, and Reading, were hanged, drawn and quartered, and many were harshly punished and killed for their treason. The premise was established for further seizures. When it was finished, over 800, of about 850 monastery-estates, had been appropriated. The 'Coffers' of The Crown were now filled for military campaigns. But Henry still waited several years, most likely because of the internal disruption the attack on The Church had caused. This solution to economical problems seems similar to what Ivan tried to accomplish with the 'Oprichnina' (1565-72).

I have not been able to find any specifics on the Russian tax-codes of the period, but the sheer logic of the Oprichnina gives the impression that there were similar principles for allowances to monarchs in Russia, as in England, and other 'emerging bureaucratic states' throughout Europe, and maybe further east as well? As the Monarch was the one responsible for foreign policy, he could levy tariffs or tolls on foreign trade and some industries, like mining, and further, in connection with minting or arms-manufacture. Besides this, the Monarch would rely on his personal domain-land to keep the Crown outfitted.

The Oprichnina was set up during a period of intense border-wars threatening to overrun the Russian Empire. It consisted in large part of 'newly' conquered Novgorodian territory and the region of Vladimir. The story starts with Ivan, frustrated by the politics of The Capital, withdrawing to Alexandrova Sloboda. There he goes on 'strike', destabilizing the ruling council, and agitating the citizens of Moscow against them. After some negotiation, the noblemen agree to grant Ivan absolute unchecked privileges in the 'Oprichnina-territories to be'.

The Livonian Wars (1558–1583) were in part a result of Ivan's will to expand his sphere of influence, to gain foothold on the Baltic shore, thus avoiding the restrictions put on Russian trade by the powers controlling the Baltic ports. This crashed with the strategic ambition of several powerful neighbors holding a stake in the disintegrating fragmented Baltic territories. The Oldenburg, Vaasa and Jagellionians, with the Habsburg, the Dutch, and the Hansa meddling in the background, wanted 'a piece of the pie'. Tension between opposing forces is a given in power-games. Crummey does overestimate Ivan's role in what was to happen. In Crummey there is a blindness being cultivated towards, that the other actors in similar manner had aggressive ambition, almost as if Crummey postulates, that Ivan could have chosen peace? Statements like that, again make me reach for my Machiavelli:

“The Romans, foreseeing troubles, dealt with them at once, and, even to avoid a war, would not let them come to a head, for they knew that war is not to be avoided, but is only put off to the advantage of others.”

Leaders at times, just must lead, but the lack of proper sources does not stop Crummey from painting a grim picture. In his work the method to the madness of the Oprichnina is to be found in Ivan's sick paranoid mind. Crummey makes it easy for himself when he states, that since the conspiracies against Ivan are so poorly documented, they probably were figments of his imagination.

"The image of Ivan as a paranoiac lashing out blindly and none too effectively is well drawn by Crummey. Undoubtedly the greed, bitter internecine rivalries and self-importance of the Boyars were injurious to the efficient functioning of the administration and contributed significantly to Russia's failures in the Livonian War."

The first thing to say about that is, that if people are proven to be disloyal to you, and they try to get you... you are not paranoid, but you have a healthy instinct for caution and survival. Crummey is at times exorbitantly hostile in his treatment of Ivan. This belittles the direct practical application of this attempt at bureaucratic management. The direct control over resources needed to wage war on the surrounding enemies, gathered in one chain of command does not seem like the plan of a madman, because it in principle is rational, as argued in Pavlov and Perrie, who also further develop the idea of Ivan as a contemporary renaissance-prince.

The Oprichina was however a large land-grab that was bound to threaten the position of all 'Gentry'. They are the main source for description of the event. Gathering large domains in the 'hands of the Crown' theoretically reduced the need to negotiate with the lords and the gentry over the pressing needs of war, aiding to streamline the strategic depth of operations under a clear command structure. In order to enact this 'bold and courageous' change in policy, a new branch of government was formed. Its officials, the Oprichniki, were enlisted from the ranks of 'free-men' while a few were noble. They proved more trustworthy to the Monarch than the Bojar Class, since they had less power and claim, to challenge or obstruct his rule.

Henry and Cromwell had two advantages when they started to plunder The Church. When the land of The Church had been appropriated, it was sold to the loyal segment of The Nobility, firming them in their resolve against The Church, and implicating them in the new order. Their payments then filled the King's 'war-chest'. Henry succeeded, and was ready to subdue the whole of Britain. The other advantage was that Scotland is not The Steppe. It is not a 'never-ending' expanse. It still can make one wonder, if Ivan was not inspired by Henry's success. We know there was direct contact between England and Russia from about 1540.

Judgment on why the Oprichina was dismantled is difficult. Letters written by a discontented mutineer like Prince Kurbsky, portraying Ivan as a tyrant, do not compare to a modern day 'aircraft black box'. It is hard to differentiate the factors leading up to the dismantlement of the Oprichina-system. Was it a system that was internally weakly constructed, or did it fail due do the external pressures of a three front war in combination with natural crop-failure? It is wise to respect that 'force major', nature, is dubbed so for obvious reasons. -that Xerxes had the Hellespont whipped, did not bring his fleet back. That the Crimean Tartars burnt Moscow might have been a tipping-point. De Madriagda suggests that the system might have fulfilled the purpose of breaking the 'grip' of the Bojars. Enough credibility had been established to unite the territories, under a reformed Bojar council which included many of the leading Oprichniki as well. Both the 'Acts of Suppression', and the establishment of the 'Oprichina', lead to an accumulation of lands, in the 'hands' of the Monarch, and to the weakening of his opposition, both nominally and relatively. Neither of the systems permanently gathered the land with the Monarch, but they permanently established a principle of supremacy.

Did the Russian State... Part VI by Nils Johann ( A Short Introduction to the Period... 'The Mafia ?)

“A prince ought to have no other aim or thought, nor select anything else for his study, than war and its rules and discipline; for this is the sole art that belongs to him who rules, and it is of such force that it not only upholds those who are born princes, but it often enables men to rise from a private station to that rank. And, on the contrary, it is seen that when princes have thought more of ease than of arms they have lost their states. And the first cause of your losing it is to neglect this art; and what enables you to acquire a state is to be master of the art. ”

In the State-formation histories of Scandinavia and the wider 'West', Finn Fuglestad uses the term “Mafia Society” to describe early state formations. I am partial to introduce that term when discussing state-formations in England and Russia, or anywhere, for that matter. It is a term that should be kept in mind during the further reading. It should be seen in relation to Spittler's definition of 'despotism'. The term describes a situation where strongmen either do, or do not, get along. They cluster together, in order to 'racketeer' in territories they dominate, or they plunder their opponents. Wealth and power in the period are still highly personal, even though the term 'Crown' and 'state' are used at points in this text.

Machiavelli makes a good companion to the period, and his contemporary work delivers a good description, rather than a normative tale. His work marks him out, as a sign of change taking place, as Berg Eriksen writes in the foreword of his translation: “The possible restoration of Roman
power [e.g. a strong bureaucratic state] in Italy would be the newest thing imaginable”. 'The Prince' has proven itself as a stable control-guideline for the comparison.

Moreover, we can in the period, see new attempts at institutional bureaucracies next to the person of the Monarch and his 'Bojars'. This paper will demonstrate, how Ivan and Henry established internal discipline within their organization. We will look at how they both ran their 'firms'. In both the territories work starts to effectuate a more efficient tax-system, and state
institutions are established to carry this out.