Did the Russian State... Part XIV by Nils Johann (Conclusion)

It are not always the material ripples of historical events that reach us. The stories of events that in their time were relevant, may much sooner reach us. The way these then are imbued with new meaning, sometimes is the only thing that makes a historical event seem relevant. It is in some way misleading, to maintain that past occasions, at any price, effect future development, that is far-flung in time, and separated by centuries. The second chapter of the paper demonstrated this, all though from an 'eagle's perspective'. This enabled us to see how the myth of a liberal, democratic and prosperous 'Western Europe', by force or ignorance, has been projected back in time, to comply with our contemporary notions and fancies of what is right and proper, while disregarding the immense change, forced upon the societies, and Institutions, that experienced the brunt, and sudden force of the Industrial Revolution.

On that basis it seems plausible, that the backwards-projection of Cold War reality, like in the leading case of Wittfogel's Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study in Total Power, certain misleads, and errors, have been allowed to occur in our perception of 16th century Russia. A tense Anglo-Russian relationship during the middle of the 19th century may have worked to establish the same effect, during the infancy of modern historiography. The emphasis on what separates the Russian and 'West-European' state formation process of the 16th century, is therefore in this paper interpreted as a false dichotomy. The dilettante 'National Histories' of the age, that favored long chains of causality for explaining their contemporary surroundings in the frame of 'The Nation', assumed, just like Yanov, Landes, Ferguson, and others, that there must be a chain-reaction spanning centuries in order to explain their contemporary condition. In order to make the writing more relevant lines of connections seem to be forced into the narrative, either backwards or forwards. Cum hoc ergo propter hoc, is a common error of reasoning where 'Correlation' is mistaken for 'Causation'. We need not all act as Skinner's pigeons.

This paper notes the challenge posed by the anachronistic concepts superimposed on the interpretation of the age, to understanding the age of Ivan and Henry on its own premise. As a response it attempts a comparison of the reigns of Ivan IV and Henry VIII. The comparison is intended to serve as an internal frame for reference for the period, but is also a search for positive similarities between the regimes. What is shown by this is a general similarity. It is tricky in such a comparison to discriminate perfectly without going in the trap of just 'cherry-picking' the examples one wants, but the paper focuses on the general conditions of statecraft of the age. By giving a general introduction to wider European developments, shaped by stronger Monarchs, who manage a paper-bureaucracy, and standing gunpowder armies, the paper sets the stage of its main subject, while establishing possibility for wider contextualisation. It then progresses to an introduction of the formation of the 'royal houses' of Henry VIII and Ivan IV, with a brief resume of their families 'road', to the power that the Monarchs would wield. Both monarchs temper and subdue the noblemen that surround them in order to ferment their own power-base. Their methods were brutal and efficient. Whether the opponents of the Crown were executed by boiling alive, drawn and quartered, or any other number of imaginative methods, the principle seems to be the same with both Crowns: Maintaining order by demonstrating power, through the application of violence.

Simply: Installing Terror. The Technical breakthroughs of the time enabled the ruling of larger territories, accompanied by centralization of power, not seen in Europe since the decline of the Roman Empire. This then also called for a restructuring of governance. Parliamentary systems are reformed to adapt to this reality and, are re-functioned to act as management organs of the Crown. At the time none of these Parliaments are embryonic 'democratic' institutions, in the modern sense of the word, but they function as a line of communication between the Monarch and the Commoners. Their main function is however to recognize the laws of the Monarch, and to effectuate the levying of taxes. The taxes are in both cases intended to serve the foreign policy of the King. - The protection of the realm; the execution of war-craft. Differences occur in the detail of how Ivan and Henry chose, or can choose, to fill their 'war-chest', and there is better method to the plan of Henry. He implicates part of his loyal nobility in his robbery of the Church, while Ivan's Oprichina leads to the estrangement, and tempering, of his high nobility. The funds from their respective heist, do however go towards the same purpose. They carry the war to their enemies, subduing them, plundering, and gaining dominance of even larger tracts of land. By the crack of the lash, and the screaming of cannon, with bloody sword in one hand, and a pen in the other, surrounded by rich palaces and poor peasants, gibbets, and henchmen, proto-bureaucratic states were formed, both in England and in Russia. They were materializing in all of Europe in the period.

Comparing two reigns of respectively forty-three and sixty years, of almost continual warfare at the western rim of Eurasia, called for an eagle-perspective in this paper, that ignores detailed differences in the formation of Russia and England, which there of course are. The grand lines of the narrative of the paper, however demonstrates that there are remarkable similarities in the formation of Russia and England. Russia is in its proto-state's functioning, during the period of the 16th century, more alike, than unlike England.

So, if you have taken the time to read through this whole paper, what are your thoughts? Any disagreements? What did you like and feel like you learned?

Did the Russian State... Part IV by Nils Johann (On the 'Miracle' of Western Europe)

A challenge that one faces when entering into the debate of an eastern or western culture dominating Russia, is the terminology itself. What is 'The West'? Is 'The West' something definable? Or rather, can it be used as a definition? It is a term that is inherently used, and it simplifies and creates order in one's mind. But does it help to understand something, or does this categorization lead us astray... or make us lazy? The suspicion arises that the category contains a lot of praise, to one self, one's own. Because it is to be understood positively, is it not? When our 'Anglo-Saxons' write about 'The West', they write about their own, their identity, and self-image. They show how they would like to portray themselves today, often at the risk of sacrificing historical fact, in favor of tunnel-vision, with regards to sources and interpretations.

The claim made by Landes and other 'Eurocentrics' (rather 'Occidentofiles') is that 'European' institutions that arose during the industrialisation, and the Industrialisation itself, can be traced back into 16th century, to their 'embryonic' state, without causing huge problems of verification. (Landes even claims the 15th century holds the 'seeds' for future industrial development.) This is best illustrated by the discussion that broke out, after David Landes and Andre Gunder Frank both brought out a book on the subject of 'world economic history' during the same year. They positioned their works extremely antithetical to each-other. In “ReOrient- Global Economy in the Asian Age” (1998), Andre Gunder Frank manifests the economical superiority of Asia for the period before the disjunction that happened around 1750 to 1850. -Something that is not widely contested. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz, Adam Smith, and other Europeans in the time were well aware of this, and they idealised China as a model for copy, and a 'Europe of the East'.

David Landes in his Wealth and Poverty of Nations (1998) does however not want this to be true. In his grasping for straws, he alleges to have found exclusively English (and when he can't force them to be English, they are Dutch) 'seeds' for explaining the Industrial revolution, back in the 15th century. This, despite the general problem of finding or constructing data-series that reach further back than 1750. His attempt at writing a 'world economic history' must be seen as a failure, because the book is mostly about Europe. His effort at documentation for his narrative is good, but rather eclectic- we might call it a case of historical tunnel-vision. Landes, as Max Weber did in 1950, also places a lot of weight on cultural exceptionalism. But it ends with a circular argument where culture is special because it is special. Of course we can agree that culture is special. But it should be noted, that it is also highly plastic, adapting itself to, and echoing, changing material circumstances. The same goes for alleged, peculiar western institutions. They are made for fulfilling a pragmatic purpose, and the institutions that do not 'bend with the wind', will eventually 'break'. The 'sexual revolution' of the 1960's could be an example... be seen as a 'breaking down' of cultural mores by beatniks and French philosophers, and a loss of 'Christian Values'. But was it not also caused by the discovery of penicillin and 'The Pill'?

As a matter a fact we know 'Europe' only takes the economic lead after about 1800, and we know that this is due to the 'industrial revolution'. The exploitation of the western colonies in order to gain surplus currency to access oriental markets, had been important up to that point. (Occidental gold and silver, and shipping, because few 'Western' product were of high enough quality, to be of interest to the Asian market, until the westerners also started dealing in drugs and erotic art.) Frank does not completely decline the plausibility of 'inherit qualities' or a longer period of preparation for this jolt in European productivity, and he explains it best in his own words:

“But it was not so thanks to any of the 'qualities' and 'preparations' alleged by Weber, Marx and their many followers, including Landes still today, who observed nothing in Asia and only myths in Europe...Instead he [Vries] makes repeated references to possibly peculiarly European institutions. Since Vries does [can?] not specify or even name any, he conveniently also protects himself from any specific rebuttal. But I can assure him again, as the book already did, that every previously alleged European institutional exceptionalism has long since been knocked down as a straw man. To illustrate the point, I quoted what Hodgson wrote over thirty years ago already: "All attempts that I have yet seen to invoke pre-Modern seminal traits in the Occident can be shown to fail under close historical analysis….This also applies to the great master, Max Weber." If Vries can do better, let him.; but he would be well advised not just to refers us back to the tired old shibboleths of David Landes.”

He then proceeds to illustrate his point, by comparing the European surge by the rise of mammals, after the wiping out of the dinosaurs, meaning that the external economical factors of Indian and later Chinese relative decline, made room for European growth. Only because the surroundings changed, expansion was made possible.

“But Europeans [sic: Some European historians] have wasted nearly 200 years of time erroneously and uselessly examining their own allegedly obviously exceptional navel instead of looking for possible exceptional qualities that only became particularly useful due to an event largely extraneous to ... Europeans themselves.” In the wake of this feud, some good work was done to explore the subject further. Jack Turner's documentary 'What the Ancients knew' (2005), gathered a wealth of evidence supporting what Frank already claims, especially in relation to Chinese economic-force-superiority up until the 19th century."

An other example from the 'Occidentofile' perspective is Robert Bucholtz' lecture-series on the rise of modern western civilization. It is even more fitting for the place and period that will be discussed later in the paper. Bucholtz specialization is the English royal court, and he is therefore, quite familiar with England. Bucholtz' 'West' therefore, is a constantly eastwards growing
'West', into areas less known to him. The eastern border is at the outset of the lecture, in the period after the black death, drawn alongside the Rhine river, and, including Italy in the south. 'The West' to Bucholtz is as much a state of mind, as it is a geographical term, and as time progresses, more areas mature into this proposed (English) mindset. It is an Anglo-centric proposal, connecting to 'The West', things that are considered virtues in Bucholtz' culture today. A more critical interpretation of the lecture would give us, that what happens actually has the opposite causal effect of what is suggested by the narrative of Bucholtz. -As England integrates values and techniques from abroad, this shapes England. The protestant reformation takes place in the 'Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation', and as we know, some of its principles are adopted in England. Suddenly the H.R.E. is party to Bucholtz' narrative of the 'West'. It is a case of 'tailor-fitting' the data to fit with a preordained result.

This poses a problem to us, because it follows that 'The West' of Bucholtz, Ferguson and Landes is seen from a tunnel, opening in the direction of what they express to hold dear. Then, the 'West' is not the dictatorships of Franco or Pinochet, even though both were situated in the the West? Is it not the slums of former 'Western' colonies? Is it not the 'antebellum' United States, where the Congressmen wrote in high-born poetic prose about freedom, to hide the fact they were owning slaves? - And something that is too often under-communicated: The situation of the African slave, is not all to unlike to the situation of the European peasant from the 16th to the 19th century. Is 'The West', not the cheap labor of children in the coal-mines of South Yorkshire, that fueled the industrialization of England, and the constant state-sponsored murder of those that opposed the exploitation? Winston Churchill may not have had Gandhi murdered, as Adolf Hitler allegedly suggested to him. But the Great British Empire surely had no problem with starving away, both the Irish, and Indians, or the inhabitants of White-chapel. The Royal Navy did in the end contribute its bit to halt the slave-trade, but only after the criminalization of the trade in 1807. It took, however, until the late 1860's, before total compliance to this act was forced through. We could go on, the examples are many, -of what 'we do not want' 'The West' to be. But what is 'The West', or rather, what would we like it to be? -In this context, it is Parliamentary systems, the rule of law, and the freedom of private enterprise and property. Liberty and justice, checks and balances, prosperity and the right to voice ones opinion. Features that Niall Ferguson in his latest book dubbed “the six killer-apps of western civilization”. A problem is of course that many of these institutions, and freedoms, first materialize much later than even 1800. Through unions and 'class-struggle' (*in a broader sense of the word). Equal voting and legal rights, never materialised during the existence of the Great British Empire, and on the mother-isle, they only became reality in 1928. In Ferguson's U.S.A., It took until 1965 for these basic civil rights to be signed into law by president L. B. Johnson.

It seems, every time that non-European state-formations have stability, their governments can inherently within this discussion be described as despotic or tyrannical. “Freedom” from this sort of government supposedly leads to innovation and development, caused by market-like competition and exchange. There is a different perspective on development in general. There is a certain truth to the words of Hobbes; that the 'freedom' of the 'barbarian' might be nasty brutish and short. The least developed areas of today are at the same time the most unstable and conflict ridden ones. Order was prevalent in the East, when these areas up until about 1800, also had a technical lead, on poor, war-torn, Western Europe: Stability equals surplus of capital, surplus of capital; wealth, equals innovation, because it reduces relative risk when it is affordable to take a loss. In modern firms research and development is the relatively, most costly sector, and access to capital, and a large amount of surplus-capital, distributed among a large part of a population will open the possibility for innovation to a aggregated extent. In Ferguson's narrative the end of the Ming dynasty in China and the factionalism and wars that followed, are a definitive triggers of decline and stagnation of development. But he has no quarrels with portraying this same sort of contemporary fractioning, as the institutional strength of Europe, spurring proto capitalist competition. It is a total contradiction, spurring doubts about the reliability of the competition narrative, as a European advantage.

All in all, it is a question of perspective, of focus, and of intent, when one wants to write about 'The West'. Another challenge is of course also that the 'West' has changed over time. It has not always been as ideal, as the connotations to the term may imply. As we will see, historical thinking and historical accuracy can be a huge challenge. 'The Cult of British Exceptionalism' does in this regard also overemphasize and distort the subject when handled by many 'Western' historians, forcefully superimposing present structures on the past. Davis' “Late Victorian Holocaust”, is an exception from the rule. -A rare example of the opposite, as it rather focuses on the brutal, 'despotic' manner in which the 'Victorians' of Great Britain, spread 'Western Civilization' in order to exploit and enslave the world.

It seems quite likely that the 'Cult of British Exceptionalism', is a result of non-recognition of the exceptional ceterius paribus development, that the surplus accumulation of the Industrial Revolution, the harnessing of immense amounts of natural power for human needs, caused, for what it was: A brief fluke of West-European material-wealth-superiority. Because some gentlemen had unlocked the secret of turning heat into motion, giving them and their peers a leading role for two hundred years. Of course it was extraordinary, like the locomotive suddenly speeding up, next to the horse and cart. There was a need to culturally explain it, ex post factum, so historians and thinkers started making up stories, cultivating plausible explanations for the fluke. Like Marx, writing his short essay on the positive effect of British imperialism in India. Or Weber, inventing the tasty, elegant theory about how 'Jesus and Luther caused factories to be built'. It is about as verifiable as the Book of Genesis. It is of course also a philosophical question, where the person trained in a tradition of Hegelian idealism will undoubtedly be looking for 'the emperor's new robe' cheering, while enthusiastically not seeing it.

As a last thought on this issue; maybe it was not enough, or maybe it was to vulgar, for the Europeans, starting our craft of writing histories, back during their age of industrial revolution, that the 'political power had grown out of the barrel of a gun', -that had been mass produced. For Harald 'Haarfagre', one of the first kings in Norway, it had not been enough simply to be King, by holding
a sword either. He had traced his linage back to Methusalem The Old, Jupiter, King Priamos of Troy and the Norse God-King Odin. Caesar had claimed to be the heir of Venus, and Swedish noble houses of the 17th century traced them selves back to Atlantis of legend. So why not claim to be the noblest race? Have the purest blood? And a to be in possession of a special, inventive, mind? The
best Kings and the finest state-institutions, or the best culture? Or can we content ourselves with the fact, that turning heat, into motion, into work, into wealth, is miraculous enough? Landes' friend in arms, Samuel Huntington sums it up elegantly when he writes: “The West won the world, not by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion, but rather by its superiority in applying organized violence. Westerners often forget this fact, non-Westerners never do.”

Comments? Questions? :)

Brief Thoughts on the Industrial Revolution

Almost all of us who have studied a little history have heard the term “Industrial Revolution” and have the basic concept of what that term means. What I find most interesting is what that term tends to leave out without deeper study and what it shows about us and the ways we as human beings and historians think. Because the term tends to suggest only huge alterations in 'industry' or business... and not in much else. However, during this time of changes many ways of human's lives in Europe changed in drastic ways and for the majority of people, not just a small group of few. These occurrences started to happen in society around 1750 may have started small but quickly made huge changes that could be seen in a short period of time. These changes can be easily seen and divided and described in four categories: industry, commerce, communications and agriculture. The first country in which these changes started to roll forth was Great Britain. If you look at some of the reasons that this country was able to step to the forefront, we can surmise some of the things that we need today to help other countries be able to expand – will talk about these advantages down below. :) One of the first things that seemed to start the 'revolution' was that large landowners in England started closing off their lands and as this practice became legal with the passage of Enclosure Acts, this process left hundreds of poor peasants without land to farm or work.

It was the process of removing the serfs and peasants from the lands that brought people to the cities and helped create a large, available and cheap work force. This created more demand for goods in the cities as well as work. So wealthy merchants or others could try and increase production to meet this demand which would in turn create more jobs. This also created the challenge of how to feed a large population with fewer people actually farming which had been the norm in times past. Agriculture changed a great deal with the Enclosure Acts as the large landowners could now farm very differently than has been accomplished in the past. Instead of several small plots of land farmed by families, a landowner could now farm hundreds of acres and instead of a variety of crops, the farmer could choose to focus on two or three popular and ready to sell crops. These crops could then be sold to feed people in other areas, to create other goods to sell such as cloth and also purchase a variety of foods to feed themselves and their families. As machines were invented to also make harvesting some crops easier with fewer people, many farmers began to grow cotton and other products as their major crops which were needed for making cloth, garments, etc... in the cities and could gain a good cash price. So industry was able to grow as businesses were able to increase production which also developed more work and increased profits for the investors or well off owners.

Commerce also began to increase as people started ignoring the guild policies and just began creating and selling goods for themselves to sell. In the past, guilds had helped limit how many goods could be made because there was a limit of how many people could make the goods. This had now changed and as people invented machines and found new ways – with water and coal- to move the machines to create products such as cloth, this also increased the quantity of good available, the variety of goods and brought prices down... which made purchasing goods possible for people who it would not have been financially feasible for before. As more people could buy goods, more goods needed to be made to keep up with the need which in turn would create more jobs, etc... The flood of agricultural products into cities helped entrepreneurs and other leaders of commerce to build larger businesses so that they could increase their supplies and sale-able goods... and brought the prices of food down as well. With all this growth and the need by the cities... and soon countries to move these goods to their place of sale quicker, travel and communication became significant challenges that people worked to overcome. It was during this time that trains were developed and the telegraph was invented- both of which helped move messages and goods quickly and efficiently to other areas. Soon people of moderate means could afford to use these forms of communication as well as the possibility to purchase newspapers or trips on trains that encouraged more openness and trade between the cities and countries they connected.

I see these four processes are spokes on the same wheel. Apart, none of the groups would have grown very quickly and change would have been small. Industry would have had very slow growth if any because there was not a large, legal work force without other jobs nor was there a large population who had money to buy the goods if the quantity of produced goods had increased. Large landowners couldn't have created the wealth that they did by their mono-culture crops if the majority of their lands were still leased by peasants. Commerce couldn't have grown at all without more goods at cheaper prices and people who felt like they could afford to purchase them. It was also able to grow because people could 'pool' their wealth to help develop a business and so individuals who didn't have enough assets and cash to start a business could still invest in a business which could make them more money. And the advances in communication made the growth of the later three quicker and more efficient as well as allowing most people to have more information of what was going on in the world around then.... making the world much larger and smaller indeed. :)

The European standard of living was significantly improved in many way by the Industrial revolution. Over time more people were able to live more comfortably, to own more clothing and goods and to have more options for work than people had in past generations. Heck, the ideas of the Enlightenment suggested that enjoying this life we have now was possible and acceptable and so the focus of living 'to get to eternity' that had been the past comfort to suffering masses was no longer the main belief of most people. The idea that everyone could improve themselves and their lives through education and hard work opened up people (all right... mostly men) to try and invent, learn and strive to rise through the ranks of society... something that had been impossible for most everyone for centuries. You no longer 'had' to go to church or belong to a specific church- don't get me wrong, it still helped make your life easier to be active in the 'right' church. The most significant improvements during this time came from some improvements in medicine, more work opportunities, opportunities to own more and for more people to participate in both commerce and consumption, as well as opportunities to travel and learn more about the world through newspapers, trains, and other forms of communication. For the first time in history news and knowledge could travel faster than people and ordinary people could participate if they could find the means to do so. Fewer people were always on the border of starvation – that was a great improvement indeed! Over time, sanitation was also improved and so disease would not be so rampant in so much of the city. Education was also more available and was available for more people.

Cities and towns had been fairly small and slow growing before the Industrial revolution. With the huge influx of workers from the rural areas and the growth of new businesses, buildings, etc... towns became cities and large cities grew to phenomenal sizes. Pollution from coal burning gave many cities entirely new 'atmospheres' as the air was heavier, had more fog and was darker as well. Cities also tended to have a great many more families living in them (so more children) than in the past. People in cities tended over time become more segregated into groups by ethnicity, income and community connections (such as family) and as such, city growth was not carefully planned. Buildings sprung up with in a few days and with very little planning... and were sometimes very close together and 'squished'. Lots of people coupled with the inability to be as sanitary as the country (due to proximity vs. amount of land) caused an increase of disease as well as disability and death. Cities were filled with very large businesses (such as factories) instead of the majority of small and so even children would work in the large factories... sometimes for as long as sixteen hours a day. As the population increased, it also help create a feeling of anonymity and fewer feelings of community which also caused other challenges such as upticks in certain amounts of crime, etc... Over time, smaller businesses became more permanent (the traveling salesman wasn't as popular) and smaller businesses developed ways to make shopping more attractive such as indoor light and windows.

Great Britain was uniquely situated to take full advantage of the growth during this time for a few reasons. One is that as the country had not fought a war of in soil for many decades. So the land and cities had not been as damaged and war-torn as most of Europe. Britain’s government was stable and had been so awhile so other institutions like banking and the law were pretty stable which gave investors and entrepreneurs less nervousness and more incentive to invest and create new businesses without the fear that the government might change and shut down their business... or war might destroy the buildings and worth forth. (As it was also one of the wealthiest countries in Europe, that also allowed for more investment.) As a smaller country covered in rivers and waterways, transporting goods was a lot faster than over land which also gave Great Britain an edge over some of the countries in Europe. With the Enclosure Acts, large landowners were able to force huge numbers of peasants off the lands they had been living on for generations and created a large workforce that needed jobs. As business taxes were generally lower in England and merchants and entrepreneurs were more socially acceptable in society, it is no surprise that Great Britain really surged forward in growth and development during the Industrial revolution.

What are your thoughts? Did you learn anything new? :)