Showing posts with label China. Show all posts
Showing posts with label China. Show all posts

2014/03/11

Did the Russian State... Part IV by Nils Johann (On the 'Miracle' of Western Europe)


A challenge that one faces when entering into the debate of an eastern or western culture dominating Russia, is the terminology itself. What is 'The West'? Is 'The West' something definable? Or rather, can it be used as a definition? It is a term that is inherently used, and it simplifies and creates order in one's mind. But does it help to understand something, or does this categorization lead us astray... or make us lazy? The suspicion arises that the category contains a lot of praise, to one self, one's own. Because it is to be understood positively, is it not? When our 'Anglo-Saxons' write about 'The West', they write about their own, their identity, and self-image. They show how they would like to portray themselves today, often at the risk of sacrificing historical fact, in favor of tunnel-vision, with regards to sources and interpretations.

The claim made by Landes and other 'Eurocentrics' (rather 'Occidentofiles') is that 'European' institutions that arose during the industrialisation, and the Industrialisation itself, can be traced back into 16th century, to their 'embryonic' state, without causing huge problems of verification. (Landes even claims the 15th century holds the 'seeds' for future industrial development.) This is best illustrated by the discussion that broke out, after David Landes and Andre Gunder Frank both brought out a book on the subject of 'world economic history' during the same year. They positioned their works extremely antithetical to each-other. In “ReOrient- Global Economy in the Asian Age” (1998), Andre Gunder Frank manifests the economical superiority of Asia for the period before the disjunction that happened around 1750 to 1850. -Something that is not widely contested. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz, Adam Smith, and other Europeans in the time were well aware of this, and they idealised China as a model for copy, and a 'Europe of the East'.

David Landes in his Wealth and Poverty of Nations (1998) does however not want this to be true. In his grasping for straws, he alleges to have found exclusively English (and when he can't force them to be English, they are Dutch) 'seeds' for explaining the Industrial revolution, back in the 15th century. This, despite the general problem of finding or constructing data-series that reach further back than 1750. His attempt at writing a 'world economic history' must be seen as a failure, because the book is mostly about Europe. His effort at documentation for his narrative is good, but rather eclectic- we might call it a case of historical tunnel-vision. Landes, as Max Weber did in 1950, also places a lot of weight on cultural exceptionalism. But it ends with a circular argument where culture is special because it is special. Of course we can agree that culture is special. But it should be noted, that it is also highly plastic, adapting itself to, and echoing, changing material circumstances. The same goes for alleged, peculiar western institutions. They are made for fulfilling a pragmatic purpose, and the institutions that do not 'bend with the wind', will eventually 'break'. The 'sexual revolution' of the 1960's could be an example... be seen as a 'breaking down' of cultural mores by beatniks and French philosophers, and a loss of 'Christian Values'. But was it not also caused by the discovery of penicillin and 'The Pill'?

As a matter a fact we know 'Europe' only takes the economic lead after about 1800, and we know that this is due to the 'industrial revolution'. The exploitation of the western colonies in order to gain surplus currency to access oriental markets, had been important up to that point. (Occidental gold and silver, and shipping, because few 'Western' product were of high enough quality, to be of interest to the Asian market, until the westerners also started dealing in drugs and erotic art.) Frank does not completely decline the plausibility of 'inherit qualities' or a longer period of preparation for this jolt in European productivity, and he explains it best in his own words:

“But it was not so thanks to any of the 'qualities' and 'preparations' alleged by Weber, Marx and their many followers, including Landes still today, who observed nothing in Asia and only myths in Europe...Instead he [Vries] makes repeated references to possibly peculiarly European institutions. Since Vries does [can?] not specify or even name any, he conveniently also protects himself from any specific rebuttal. But I can assure him again, as the book already did, that every previously alleged European institutional exceptionalism has long since been knocked down as a straw man. To illustrate the point, I quoted what Hodgson wrote over thirty years ago already: "All attempts that I have yet seen to invoke pre-Modern seminal traits in the Occident can be shown to fail under close historical analysis….This also applies to the great master, Max Weber." If Vries can do better, let him.; but he would be well advised not just to refers us back to the tired old shibboleths of David Landes.”

He then proceeds to illustrate his point, by comparing the European surge by the rise of mammals, after the wiping out of the dinosaurs, meaning that the external economical factors of Indian and later Chinese relative decline, made room for European growth. Only because the surroundings changed, expansion was made possible.

“But Europeans [sic: Some European historians] have wasted nearly 200 years of time erroneously and uselessly examining their own allegedly obviously exceptional navel instead of looking for possible exceptional qualities that only became particularly useful due to an event largely extraneous to ... Europeans themselves.” In the wake of this feud, some good work was done to explore the subject further. Jack Turner's documentary 'What the Ancients knew' (2005), gathered a wealth of evidence supporting what Frank already claims, especially in relation to Chinese economic-force-superiority up until the 19th century."

An other example from the 'Occidentofile' perspective is Robert Bucholtz' lecture-series on the rise of modern western civilization. It is even more fitting for the place and period that will be discussed later in the paper. Bucholtz specialization is the English royal court, and he is therefore, quite familiar with England. Bucholtz' 'West' therefore, is a constantly eastwards growing
'West', into areas less known to him. The eastern border is at the outset of the lecture, in the period after the black death, drawn alongside the Rhine river, and, including Italy in the south. 'The West' to Bucholtz is as much a state of mind, as it is a geographical term, and as time progresses, more areas mature into this proposed (English) mindset. It is an Anglo-centric proposal, connecting to 'The West', things that are considered virtues in Bucholtz' culture today. A more critical interpretation of the lecture would give us, that what happens actually has the opposite causal effect of what is suggested by the narrative of Bucholtz. -As England integrates values and techniques from abroad, this shapes England. The protestant reformation takes place in the 'Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation', and as we know, some of its principles are adopted in England. Suddenly the H.R.E. is party to Bucholtz' narrative of the 'West'. It is a case of 'tailor-fitting' the data to fit with a preordained result.

This poses a problem to us, because it follows that 'The West' of Bucholtz, Ferguson and Landes is seen from a tunnel, opening in the direction of what they express to hold dear. Then, the 'West' is not the dictatorships of Franco or Pinochet, even though both were situated in the the West? Is it not the slums of former 'Western' colonies? Is it not the 'antebellum' United States, where the Congressmen wrote in high-born poetic prose about freedom, to hide the fact they were owning slaves? - And something that is too often under-communicated: The situation of the African slave, is not all to unlike to the situation of the European peasant from the 16th to the 19th century. Is 'The West', not the cheap labor of children in the coal-mines of South Yorkshire, that fueled the industrialization of England, and the constant state-sponsored murder of those that opposed the exploitation? Winston Churchill may not have had Gandhi murdered, as Adolf Hitler allegedly suggested to him. But the Great British Empire surely had no problem with starving away, both the Irish, and Indians, or the inhabitants of White-chapel. The Royal Navy did in the end contribute its bit to halt the slave-trade, but only after the criminalization of the trade in 1807. It took, however, until the late 1860's, before total compliance to this act was forced through. We could go on, the examples are many, -of what 'we do not want' 'The West' to be. But what is 'The West', or rather, what would we like it to be? -In this context, it is Parliamentary systems, the rule of law, and the freedom of private enterprise and property. Liberty and justice, checks and balances, prosperity and the right to voice ones opinion. Features that Niall Ferguson in his latest book dubbed “the six killer-apps of western civilization”. A problem is of course that many of these institutions, and freedoms, first materialize much later than even 1800. Through unions and 'class-struggle' (*in a broader sense of the word). Equal voting and legal rights, never materialised during the existence of the Great British Empire, and on the mother-isle, they only became reality in 1928. In Ferguson's U.S.A., It took until 1965 for these basic civil rights to be signed into law by president L. B. Johnson.

It seems, every time that non-European state-formations have stability, their governments can inherently within this discussion be described as despotic or tyrannical. “Freedom” from this sort of government supposedly leads to innovation and development, caused by market-like competition and exchange. There is a different perspective on development in general. There is a certain truth to the words of Hobbes; that the 'freedom' of the 'barbarian' might be nasty brutish and short. The least developed areas of today are at the same time the most unstable and conflict ridden ones. Order was prevalent in the East, when these areas up until about 1800, also had a technical lead, on poor, war-torn, Western Europe: Stability equals surplus of capital, surplus of capital; wealth, equals innovation, because it reduces relative risk when it is affordable to take a loss. In modern firms research and development is the relatively, most costly sector, and access to capital, and a large amount of surplus-capital, distributed among a large part of a population will open the possibility for innovation to a aggregated extent. In Ferguson's narrative the end of the Ming dynasty in China and the factionalism and wars that followed, are a definitive triggers of decline and stagnation of development. But he has no quarrels with portraying this same sort of contemporary fractioning, as the institutional strength of Europe, spurring proto capitalist competition. It is a total contradiction, spurring doubts about the reliability of the competition narrative, as a European advantage.

All in all, it is a question of perspective, of focus, and of intent, when one wants to write about 'The West'. Another challenge is of course also that the 'West' has changed over time. It has not always been as ideal, as the connotations to the term may imply. As we will see, historical thinking and historical accuracy can be a huge challenge. 'The Cult of British Exceptionalism' does in this regard also overemphasize and distort the subject when handled by many 'Western' historians, forcefully superimposing present structures on the past. Davis' “Late Victorian Holocaust”, is an exception from the rule. -A rare example of the opposite, as it rather focuses on the brutal, 'despotic' manner in which the 'Victorians' of Great Britain, spread 'Western Civilization' in order to exploit and enslave the world.

It seems quite likely that the 'Cult of British Exceptionalism', is a result of non-recognition of the exceptional ceterius paribus development, that the surplus accumulation of the Industrial Revolution, the harnessing of immense amounts of natural power for human needs, caused, for what it was: A brief fluke of West-European material-wealth-superiority. Because some gentlemen had unlocked the secret of turning heat into motion, giving them and their peers a leading role for two hundred years. Of course it was extraordinary, like the locomotive suddenly speeding up, next to the horse and cart. There was a need to culturally explain it, ex post factum, so historians and thinkers started making up stories, cultivating plausible explanations for the fluke. Like Marx, writing his short essay on the positive effect of British imperialism in India. Or Weber, inventing the tasty, elegant theory about how 'Jesus and Luther caused factories to be built'. It is about as verifiable as the Book of Genesis. It is of course also a philosophical question, where the person trained in a tradition of Hegelian idealism will undoubtedly be looking for 'the emperor's new robe' cheering, while enthusiastically not seeing it.

As a last thought on this issue; maybe it was not enough, or maybe it was to vulgar, for the Europeans, starting our craft of writing histories, back during their age of industrial revolution, that the 'political power had grown out of the barrel of a gun', -that had been mass produced. For Harald 'Haarfagre', one of the first kings in Norway, it had not been enough simply to be King, by holding
a sword either. He had traced his linage back to Methusalem The Old, Jupiter, King Priamos of Troy and the Norse God-King Odin. Caesar had claimed to be the heir of Venus, and Swedish noble houses of the 17th century traced them selves back to Atlantis of legend. So why not claim to be the noblest race? Have the purest blood? And a to be in possession of a special, inventive, mind? The
best Kings and the finest state-institutions, or the best culture? Or can we content ourselves with the fact, that turning heat, into motion, into work, into wealth, is miraculous enough? Landes' friend in arms, Samuel Huntington sums it up elegantly when he writes: “The West won the world, not by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion, but rather by its superiority in applying organized violence. Westerners often forget this fact, non-Westerners never do.”

Comments? Questions? :)


2014/03/08

Did The Russian State Form in a Different Manner than Its Occidental Neighbours? - Part I by Nils Johann


Can Russia be seen as following the same formative patterns as the new bureaucratic (proto-) states rising in Western Europe? A discussion in historiography, world history and the problems of long chains of causality, exemplified by a comparison of Russian and English political history during the reigns of Ivan IV and Henry VIII. (Late medieval/Northern Renaissance period, 16th century.)

While studying medieval Russia two questions kept popping up in the Literature: Does Russia have its background in “Eastern” (Asiatic) or “Western” (European) culture? Does a possible Asiatic background account for the perceived “backwardness” of the land? During the reading, a suspicion of double-standards for the 'scales' we use to measure the 'East' and the 'West' arose. Marginal cosmetic differences seemed to be exploited to exasperate a narrative, of a distant, strange, and mythical Russia. The historiographical discussion will start with the more specific grand works and perspectives concerning Russia, opened up by Ostrowski's essay on "The Mongol Origins of Muscovite Political institutions", which served as a inspiration for this work. What then also needs to be addressed is the claim of Russian backwardness which is the main narrative thread in Alexander Yanov's work, and in large parts in other writings, like the work of Wittfogel. Is the way Russia is portrayed up to this day, intentionally overemphasising minor differences, as a result of the political tension that ensued between its rulers and the neighbors in 'The West', rather than a matter of fact? Could the portrayal also be the result of sloppy methodology... even if some Russian scholars themselves adopt this view during the zenith of British hegemony, in the middle of the 19th century? It became my desire to look at the subject with a 'Homeric blindness' and a 'Ranke'an' moral disassociation.

While dealing with this question the main challenge gave itself by the seemingly ethereal qualities of terms like 'Europe' utilized in the discussion. An approach was finally opened up by 'zooming out' and taking a look at Frank's work in "ReOrient- Global Economy in the Asian Age" (1998) and by the discussion that ensued between him and Landes, Goldstone, Vries, Pomeranz and others. I still remember discussing the 'hot topic' of the 'special' European development with Vries back in 2004, and also that it ended with Vries passionately leaving.

I will make an account of this larger discussion further on because it will provide the proper context for discussing what 'Western Traits' actually are, and how far back we actually are honestly able to superimpose this term back in time. Goldstone's suggestion: To see Europe as the (*'barbaric') rim-lands of “Civilization”. Civilization at first spreading from Mesopotamia, in the direction of Europe, is a good perspective for helping us understand this.

With the narrative, that: Every time non-European state-formations have stability, their government can inherently, within this discussion, be described as despotic or tyrannical, we might be led astray: As long as there was order in China, and India, up until about 1800, these areas also maintained a technical lead on poor, war-torn Western-Europe: Stability equals innovation, because relative risk is reduced, and more persons are allowed to specialize. Risk becomes acceptable when it is affordable to take a loss.

In order to answer the question of the paper, what follows is an introduction to the greater European realm during the lives of Henry VIII (*1491-†1547) of England and Ivan IV (*1530-†1584) of Russia. This context is important, because looking at Russia isolated, can sometimes make us forget the realities of late-medieval/Renaissance life, in its westward neighbors. We could go into the trap of unintentionally only comparing it to our life experiences today, leading us to handle the subject-matter unhistorical. The demonstration will then continue by looking at, and comparing their reigns, which are more alike, than proponents of British exceptionalism, or of the Asiatic culture of Russia, would care for. We start out by comparing their families rise to power and their relation to the other noble families. There follows a comparison of their household management, the legal status of the Emperors, and their warfare.

In several works by, amongst others, Crummy and Yanov, the reign of Ivan IV is held up as an example of 'non-European' political behavior. When we with that approach compare Ivan's reign to that of Henry VIII, interesting choices for conclusion open up. Neither Henry, nor Ivan, are behaving like the Europeans of Ferguson or Wittfogel. The alleged “democratic”, free Occident, stands like an elegant myth, with its cradle in a later age. In short, the privilege of a few noblemen in Britain after 1688, does not make out as credible freedom, and in the 1540's, English political conditions do not stray remarkably from conditions in Russia. In the comparison of chapter 4, a pattern will emerge, that highlights the similarities in behavior of the two Monarchs and their Crown. Both castigate and subjugate the other competing nobles. In order to accumulate capital they reform their management and communication systems, laying the groundwork for a bureaucratic state. They do this in order to exploit the realm, and to aggregate power in their own hands. This enables their wars of conquest. Standing gunpowder-armies enable them to project their power further than their predecessors. It should be acknowledged that differences between England and Russia, but when looking at the grand motions, an impression of similar development for the period forms.


Comments.... Questions? :)

2011/02/06

The Earliest Beginnings of a Modern Russia

In modern times, Russia is the largest country in the world with over six million square miles of land. It is the ninth most populous nation in the world today with 142 million people, shares borders with more countries than any other existing in the world and has the world's largest reserves of mineral/energy and forest resources. Over its centuries of history, the boundaries of land and the people that we call Russian today have changed a great deal. This paper will discuss who the earliest known inhabitants were of this land was well as migration and the areas they settled in which include the modern cities of Novgorod and Kiev.

The focal point of the earliest Russian culture was centered around Slavic tribal kingdoms that populated several areas (along with a few other groups of people that were assimilated into the Slavic tribes) in and around the areas of Novgorod and Kiev. One source describes how goods would be brought by boat west towards Russia through the Caspian Sea and up the Volga river to the place where Novgorod was built and stands today. These lands were populated by the formerly discussed groups whose earliest members formed tribes and then cities- joining together into a unique state which is known as Kievan Rus... and is the starting point for three current Slavic nations- Russia, Ukraine and Belarus In the state of Kievan Rus, many individuals settled in the areas they called Novgorod and Kiev and then continued to spread out to other surrounding areas. (These two cities retain these names today) Both cities existed before the formation of the state Kievan Rus was officially formed in 880 by Prince Oleg who chose the city of Kiev as his capital city. In fact the city of Kiev 'celebrated' its 1500th anniversary in 1982- that must be a pretty interesting place to see the many layers of history in its many streets and buildings.

One attraction to the city of Kiev is its location. The many nearby rivers and waterways made Kiev an excellent place for travel and trade and this town was able to become the center of a trade route between Constantinople and Scandinavia. The Dnieper River runs right through the town and within the modern limits of the city of Kiev, there are over 400 bodies of open water including rivers, tributaries, lakes, etc... Novgorod also had excellent access to the Oka and Volga rivers. Once described as the bridge between the European lands and the Asian lands which probably also helped it prosper as a trading partner or trade route. Novgorod also has the distinction of being able to reach several large bodies of water such as seas for trading with other nations- these are the Baltic, Black, Caspian and White Sea as well as the Sea of Azov. Both places have a short window/climate for growing crops and other forms of agriculture... and both places had large resources of forests for wood which would have helped with boat building, buildings and even material for trade... such as for food! It certainly is a testament to the longevity and the resources surrounding these cities that they are still there and are habitable (still growing today!)- even when they were destroyed in time of war they were rebuilt right over the destroyed city.

There were many excellent reasons for migration early in Russia's history. The land itself is located in the northern most reaches of the globe and reaches across several time zones. Winters are generally longer than in other countries with a more southern base and summers are equally short. The land or geography of Russia is generally flat with few mountains so expansion was easy... add the waterways and travel/migration was even easier. Both the cities of Kiev and Novgorod were probably built by their first inhabitants because they did have more options for trade, living, travel, etc... than some of the surrounding areas. These areas, because of the great capacity for moving people and goods quickly, would have been very powerful cities- commercially strong and politically sensitive and valuable. Having control of the land around these rivers as well as the waterway itself would shape much of Russia's history over the last several centuries. These areas also had large resources of building materials with the huge forests which could also have been used to build tools, boats or ships, houses or even heat. Other resources that were available were plenty of 'fur' animals, and access to warm water ports (a few mentioned above). I suspect, and admit that this is a guess from the different readings, but the climate in these two cities would have been moderated by the lowlands and the large amounts of water... whereas other areas in Russia may not have had or do have such a 'nice' climate.

Before this class, I have known only a few tiny tidbits about Russia and most of them are 'famous' tidbits. I had heard of Lenin and Stalin and not much very flattering about either of them. I had also heard of Gorbachev and and the 'collapse' and of Putin and his successor- I have become a current news reader over the last decade. I will admit that I do not have much of an opinion either way of Putin or Mendeleev mainly because I do not trust our newspapers to tell me an unbiased account. The only other tidbit that I have a bit of knowledge on is the most obvious- Nicolas I and Alexandra and their children... and can't forget Rasputin! I signed up for a class on Russian history for a few reasons. One is that I doubt that Russia is nearly as romantic as it seems in my mind... or as foreign. I also am not impressed with the idea that I have been studying history for years and feel as if I was weaned on it, but know almost nothing about Russia or China. And I think I would like to become more well rounded in that regard. Thank you for the opportunity!

2010/08/25

1994


“I don't know all the answers but I'll do my best to live up to the rising that won't let me rest” - Jason Deere

The other day I was listening to a radio show while driving to an appointment that discusses current topics and situations over the globe. I was listening while they talked about the situation in Darfur. Over the last few years I wished I could do something about it, anything.... just as long as it would help someone. But I have allowed my life and my problems to keep me distracted. I have allowed my life to pull me along and whisper softly in my ear - “ You are too busy..., You need help...,You have so much to do...., You cannot survive if you try to do more..., etc...” So I pray for these people... and I do nothing. While some would say that a prayer is better than nothing, a prayer rarely feed the starving and saves the malnourished. It rarely stands as a shield in front of the gun and the knife of a person fills with hatred, ignorance, and free agency. I had kidded myself or at least convinced myself that I was doing all that I could. But then I listened to this radio program.

I listened to these beautiful women talk about a world of people like me. People who allow bad things to happen and do nothing. People who even in small ways could have done something and still do nothing. I will admit that the more I listened the more I felt the hot prickles of shame. I pulled over to the side of the road and just sat there and cried. My own problems, the problems that I feel are so overwhelming, painful and so difficult that I can't get past them seemed so small... so insignificant... and yes, even the big ones seemed almost petty.

Then one of the women mentioned the Rwandan massacre. She mentioned that she didn't know it was going on at the time it happened because she was young and 'busy'. So she did nothing because she knew nothing- not one inkling that it was going on. She then mentioned that she hadn't been busy with anything really important in 1994. And for a brief moment I could not breath. I had always thought that this massacre happened when I was a baby or a young girl. As a historian (OK, I only pretend to be a historian), I have focused so much on prehistory, the beginnings of history and then the beginning of medieval times. I have focused on certain countries and certain people and the things that have caught my fancy. My history knowledge mostly ends at WWII. Yes, I can name US presidents and some of what each of them have done. I can mention some stuff like the Cold War and the Berlin Wall and can converse on a semi- intelligent and informed basis on them. That's about it though. But I was an adult in 1994. I was graduating from high school and finding a place to live. I was ditching school, getting good grades, performing in theater both in and out of school, and desperately trying to hold myself together. I was working three jobs, trying to control the anger and sorrow I felt towards my parents and my upbringing. I had met my future husband and was embarking on a career path that would change my life. And at the same time, approx 800,000 people were dying- hacked to death. And I knew nothing and I did nothing. For over one million people, that was a year that cannot be forgotten. They lost their family, their health, their security and their lives. It is estimated that twenty percent of the population died. What would it have been like to be part of the other eighty percent? I can't fathom. I sit here and write this and try... and I just can't. Not knowing seems like such a lousy excuse for failing to do something...even something small. But I cannot blame myself alone. Almost no one did anything to stop this. I am an American. I have been told by my media and by my church so many times that I live in God's favored land... that I am so blessed to live in the best country in the world. That we are a superpower and the “world's policemen” and yet... we did nothing. Nothing at all.

For the last several years, I have believed in a quote I heard in some of my early medical education classes – 'With knowledge comes responsibility'. Well, I can do nothing about what happened in Rwanda. But I am alive now. I have hands that are strong and willing to work... and Darfur is still happening. So far, almost 3 million people have died. People are dying daily from sickness, malnutrition, trauma. And it appears in some ways that they are the lucky ones. They no longer have to worry about seeing their children kills in front of their eyes. They no longer have to fear rape and pain. They no longer have to fear death. Those who are still alive and pray probably ask for many things... I wonder if they pray for the opportunity to live for another day. This conflict began in 2003 and is still going on.... Almost half a million people are displaced and driven from their homes with no where to go.

I drove to my appointment, completed it, and returned to my car. I made a promise to myself and Heavenly Father that I would do something. I have a family, a son who needs me and no money. My health is also shaky. Coming up with something I could do that would be meaningful- even if it was only meaningful to the Father and me in the sense that my contribution would be too small to make a difference on its own. It would be meaningful because I made it... because I did something... and because if enough of us did something, it would make a difference. So what could I do?

I started hunting in my spare moments. My blackberry never seemed to leave my hand. It followed me to the bathroom, to the dinner table... frankly I was hard pressed to put it down while driving. But here is what I found.

1. China is a business partner with Sudan. Because of this relationship, the UN Security Council is unable to pass any resolution that actually causes Sudan hardship- China will not allow it.

2. The leaders of the countries in this world have a lousy notion of sovereignty (usually defined as the idea that a country can do whatever it wants within its own borders. That notion can clearly be allowed to go too far.

So, I decided to try and not buy anything made in China. I doubt anyone will notice. I have noticed because it has already caused me some problems. I was just getting ready to purchased some plastic storage bins and a filing cabinet. I can't- I cannot seem to find any anywhere in this country that have not been made in China. Reading packaging on things that are not food is a new tasks for me. But I am determined to figure it out. Do I think that I will be perfect at this? No. I am sure that I will make compromises for something that I truly feel we need and can't find anywhere else. But I am determined. It doesn't feel like enough, but I think it is a start...

If you have read this post, you now have the knowledge. With knowledge comes responsibility. We as a human race but also Heavenly Father's beloved children have a responsibility, nae, an obligation to do something! What will you do?